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Abstract
In general, faults cannot be prevented; instead, they need to be tolerated to guarantee certain degrees of software dependability.
We develop a theory for fault tolerance for a distributed pi-calculus, whereby locations act as units of failure and redundancy is
distributed across independently failing locations. We give formal definitions for fault tolerant programs in our calculus, based on
the well studied notion of contextual equivalence. We then develop bisimulation proof techniques to verify fault tolerance properties
of distributed programs and show they are sound with respect to our definitions for fault tolerance.
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1. Introduction
One reason for the study of programs in the presence of faults, i.e. defects at the lowest level of abstractions [2], is to
be able to construct more dependable systems, meaning systems exhibiting a high probability of behaving according
to their specification [18]. System dependability is often expressed through attributes like maintainability, availability,
safety and reliability, the latter of which is defined as a measure of the continuous delivery of correct behaviour [18].
There are a number of approaches for achieving system dependability in the presence of faults, ranging from fault
removal, fault prevention and fault tolerance.
The fault tolerant approach to system dependability consist of various techniques that employ redundancy to
prevent faults from generating failure, i.e. abnormal behaviour caused by faults [2]. Two forms of redundancy are
space redundancy (replication), i.e. using several copies of the same system components, and time redundancy, i.e.
performing the same chunk of computation more than once. Redundancy can also be managed in various ways: certain
fault tolerant techniques are based on fault detection which subsequently trigger fault recovery; other techniques do
not use fault detection and still attain fault masking – these, however, tend to be more expensive in terms of redundancy
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: francalanzaa@doc.ic.ac.uk (A. Francalanza).
1567-8326/$ - see front matter ( 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jlap.2007.03.003
A. Francalanza, M. Hennessy / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 73 (2007) 22–50 23
usage (time redundancy). If enough redundancy is used and it is managed appropriately, this can lead to fault masking,
where the specified behaviour is preserved without noticeable glitches.
Fault tolerance is of particular relevance in distributed computing. Distribution yields a natural notion of partial
failure, whereby faults affect a subset of the computation. Partial failure, in turn, gives scope for introducing redundancy
as replication, distributed across independently failing entities such as locations. In general, the higher the replication,
the greater the potential for fault tolerance. Nevertheless, fault tolerance also depends on how replicas are managed.
One classification, due to [18], identifies three classes, namely active replication (all replicas are invoked for every
operation), passive replication (operations are invoked on primary replicas and secondary replicas are updated in batches
at checkpoints), and lazy replication (a hybrid of the previous two approaches, exploiting the separation between write
and read operations).
In this paper we address fault tolerance in a distributed setting, focusing on simple examples using stateless
(read-only) replicas which are invoked only once. This simplification obviates the need for additional machinery to
sequence multiple requests (in the case of active replication) or synchronise the state of replicas (in the case of passive
replication); as a result management techniques based on lazy replication simply collapse into passive replication
category. Nevertheless, these simple examples still capture the essence of the concepts we choose to study. We code
these examples in a simplified version of Dπ [10] with failing locations [4], a distributed version of the standard
π -calculus[16], where the locations that host processes model closely physical network nodes.
Example 1 (Fault tolerant servers). Consider the systems serveri , three server implementations accepting client
requests on channel req with two arguments, x being the value to process and y being the reply channel on which the
answer is returned. Requests are forwarded to internal databases, denoted by the scoped channel data, distributed and
replicated across the auxiliary locations k1, k2 and k3. A database looks up the mapping of the value x using some
unspecified function f (−) and returns the answer, f (x), back on port y. When multiple (database) replicas are used,
as in server2 and server3, requests are sent to all replicas in an arbitrary fashion, without the use of failure detection,
and multiple answers are synchronised at l on the scoped channel sync, returning the first answer received on y.
server1 ⇐ (ν data)
(
l[[req?(x, y).go k1.data!〈x, y, l〉]]
| k1[[data?(x, y, z).go z.y!〈f (x)〉]]
)
server2 ⇐ (ν data)
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
l
⎡⎣⎡⎣req?(x, y).(νsync)
⎛⎝go k1.data!〈x, sync, l〉| go k2.data!〈x, sync, l〉
| sync?(x).y!〈x〉
⎞⎠⎤⎦⎤⎦
| k1[[data?(x, y, z).go z.y!〈f (x)〉]]
| k2[[data?(x, y, z).go z.y!〈f (x)〉]]
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
server3 ⇐ (ν data)
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
l
⎡⎢⎢⎣
⎡⎢⎢⎣req?(x, y).(νsync)
⎛⎜⎜⎝
go k1.data!〈x, sync, l〉
| go k2.data!〈x, sync, l〉
| go k3.data!〈x, sync, l〉
| sync?(x).y!〈x〉
⎞⎟⎟⎠
⎤⎥⎥⎦
⎤⎥⎥⎦
| k1[[data?(x, y, z).go z.y!〈f (x)〉]]
| k2[[data?(x, y, z).go z.y!〈f (x)〉]]
| k3[[data?(x, y, z).go z.y!〈f (x)〉]]
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
The theory developed in [4] enables us to differentiate between these systems, based on the different behaviour
observed when composed with systems such as
client ⇐ l[[req!〈v, ret〉]]
in a setting where locations may fail; in the definition of client, ret is the name of a reply channel, and v is some
value appropriate to the unspecified function f (−). Here we go one step further, allowing us to quantify, in some
sense, the difference between these systems. Intuitively, if locations k1, k2 and k3 can fail in fail-stop fashion [17] and
observations are limited to location l only, then server2 seems to be more fault tolerant than server1. In fact observers
limited to l, such as client, cannot observe changes in behaviour in server2 when at most 1 location from k1, k2 and
k3 fails. Similarly, server3 is more fault tolerant than server1 and server2 because the composite system
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server3 | client
preserves its behaviour at l up to 2 faults occurring at any of k1, k2 and k3.
In this paper we give a formal definition of when a system is deemed to be fault tolerant up to n-faults, which
coincides with this intuition. As in [4] we need to consider systems M , running on a network, which we will represent
as   M , where  is some representation of the current state of the network. Then we will say that M is fault-tolerant
up to n faults, when running on network , if
  M ∼= Fn[  M] (1)
where Fn[ ] is some context which induces at most n faults on , and ∼= is some behavioural equivalence between
system descriptions.
A key aspect of this behavioural equivalence is the implicit separation between reliable locations, which are assumed
not to fail, and unreliable locations, which may fail. In the above example, l is reliable while k1, k2 and k3 are assumed
unreliable, thus subject to failure. Furthermore, it is essential that observers not have access to these unreliable locations,
at any time during a computation. The general intuition is that we shield users from unreliable resources, thereby
ensuring that no user code fails. But another important reason, which is more specific to this work, is that if observers
are allowed to access unreliable locations then the proposed (1) above would no longer capture the intuitive notion of
fault-tolerance up to n faults. For instance, we would no longer have
  server2 ∼= F 1[  server2]
An observer with access to any of the locations k1, k2, k3 would be able to detect possible failures in F 1[  server2],
not present in   server2, and thus discriminate between the two configurations.
We enforce this separation between reliable, observable locations and unreliable, unobservable locations using a
simple type system in which reliable locations are represented as public values, and unreliable locations are represented
as confined. In particular the typing system ensures that confined values, that is the unreliable locations, never become
available at public locations.
In the second part of the paper we develop co-inductive proof techniques for proving system fault tolerance, that is
establishing identities of the form (1) above; this can be seen as a continuation of the work in [4]. One novel aspect of
the current paper is the use of extended configurations which have the form
〈, n〉  M (2)
Here, the network  is bounded by the number n, denoting the maximum number of faults that  can still incur at
unreliable locations. This extra network information allows us to define transitions which model the effect of the fault
contexts on the network state in (1). More importantly however, it gives us more control over our proofs. For instance,
it allows us to express how many unreliable locations may still fail, without committing ourselves to stating precisely
which of these locations will fail, as is the case with fault contexts in (1). In addition, when we reach an extended
configuration where n = 0 in (2) above, we can treat unreliable locations as immortal (reliable) since the extended
configuration failure bound prohibits further unreliable locations from failing. All this turns out to alleviate some of
the burden of constructing our proofs for fault tolerance.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 formally defines the language we use, DπLoc, together
with a reduction semantics. It also contains the type system for enforcing the separation between public and confined
locations. With this reduction semantics we can adapt the standard notion of reduction barbed congruence, [11,8],
to DπLoc. But because of our type system, we are assured that the resulting behavioural equivalence ∼= reflects
the fact that observations can only be made at public locations. In Section 3 we give our formal definitions of
fault-tolerance, which relies on considering public locations as reliable and confined locations as unreliable. More
specifically, we give two versions of (1) above, called static and dynamic fault tolerance, motivating the difference
between the two via examples. Proof techniques for establishing fault tolerance are given in Section 4 where we
give a complete co-inductive characterisation of ∼= using labelled actions. In Section 5 we refine these proof tech-
niques for the more demanding fault tolerant definition, dynamic fault tolerance, using co-inductive definitions over
extended configurations. We also develop useful up-to techniques for presenting witness bisimulations for extended
configurations. Section 6 concludes by outlining the main contributions of the paper and discussing future and related
work.
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2. The language
We assume a set of variables Vars, ranged over by x, y, z, . . . and a separate set of names, Names, ranged over
by n,m, . . ., which is divided into locations, Locs, ranged over by l, k, . . . and channels, Chans, ranged over by
a, b, c, . . .. Finally we use u, v, . . . to range over the set of identifiers, consisting of either variables and names.
The syntax of our language, DπLoc, is a variation of Dπ [10] and is given in Table 1. The main syntactic category
is that of systems, ranged over by M,N : these are essentially a collection of located processes, or agents, composed
in parallel where location and channel names may be scoped to a subset of agents. The syntax for processes, P,Q,
is an extension of that in Dπ . There is input and output on channels; in the latter V represents a tuple of identifiers,
while in the former X is tuple of variables, to be interpreted as a pattern. There are also the standard constructs for
parallel composition, replicated input, local declarations, a test for equality between identifiers, migration and a zero
process. The only addition to the original Dπ is ping k.P else Q, which tests for the liveness status of k in the style
of [1,15] and branches to P if k is alive and Q otherwise. For these terms we assume the standard notions of free and
bound occurrences of both names and variables, together with the associated concepts of α-conversion and substitution.
We also assume that systems are closed, that is they have no free variable occurrences. Note that all of the examples
discussed in Section 1 are valid system level terms in DπLoc. But it is worth emphasising that when we write definitions
of the form
sys ⇐ S
the identifier sys is not part of our language; such definitions merely introduce convenient abbreviations for system
level terms; in the above sys is simply an abbreviation for the term S.
Types: The original Dπ [10] comes endowed with a rich type system used to enforce access control policies. This is
ignored in the current paper as it addresses issues which are orthogonal to our concerns. Instead, as explained in Section
1, we use a simple type system for enforcing visibility constraints on values. The two main type categories, channels
and locations, are decorated by visibility annotations, giving chV〈U˜〉 and locV, where V may either be p, public, or c,
confined. In Table 1 these are called stateless types, and are ranged over by U.
The essential constraint enforced by the typing system is that public channels, that is channels whose visibility is
p, can only be used to transmit purely public values; we use P to range over the types of these values. The type system
also enforces a secondary constraint, namely that all confined locations are free and their number is fixed throughout
execution. Stated otherwise, it prohibits scoped confined locations and the creation of fresh confined locations. The
reason for the primary constraint is to prohibit observers, which are restricted to public channels/locations, from
gaining access to confined channel/location names through interaction. The reason for the secondary restriction is that
our definitions of fault tolerance depend on complete knowledge of the unreliable (confined) locations at the beginning
of the analysis; we revisit this point later in Section 3.
However there is a complication. As explained in [4], the reduction semantics is considerably simplified if we
also allow types to record the liveness status of a location, whether it is alive or dead. Thus we introduce two further
Table 1
Syntax of typed DπF
Types
U, W ::= chc〈U˜〉 | P | locV (stateless types) V ::= p | c (visibility)
P ::= chp〈P˜〉 | locp (public types)
T, R ::= chc〈U˜〉 | P | locSV (stateful types) S ::= a | d (liveness status)
Processes
P,Q ::= u!〈V 〉.P (output) | u?(X).P (input)
| if v=u then P else Q (matching) | ∗ u?(X).P (replicated input)
| (ν n :T)P (name declaration) | go u.P (migration)
| 0 (inertion) | P |Q (for k)
| ping u.P else Q (status testing)
Systems
M,N,O ::= l[P ] (located process) | N |M (parallel)
| (ν n :T)N (hiding)
26 A. Francalanza, M. Hennessy / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 73 (2007) 22–50
annotations, a and d, which can be added to the locations types, giving the forms locaV and locdV. This gives a new
class of types, the stateful types, ranged over by T, R. It should be emphasised however that although these stateful
types are used in the typing system, typeability does not depend in any way on these liveness status annotations used
on the location types.
A type environment  is a partial function from names to stateful types whose domain is finite. However when
type-checking we wish to ignore the liveness status annotation on types. Consequently we define judgements of the
form
  n : U (3)
where U is a stateless type. The returned type U is obtained simply by dropping the any liveness status annotation in
(n).
Example 2 (Public types). We can have the type assignments
  a : chp〈chp〈chp〈〉〉〉 and   a : chc〈chp〈chp〈〉〉〉
We can assign channel names to public channel types that communicate public values (first assignment) or to confined
channel types that communicate arbitrary values (second assignment). However, we cannot have
  a : chp〈chc〈chp〈〉〉〉
because the object type of a public channel type must also be a public type. Similarly, we cannot have the type
assignment
  a : chc〈chp〈chc〈〉〉〉
because, even though public values can be communicated on confined channels, the public channel communicated
does not constitute a valid public type since its object type is a confined channel.
Our typing judgements take the form
  N
and are defined by the rules in Table 2, which use an extended form of type environment, ; these, in addition to
names, also map variables to stateless types. The rules are standard value passing ones designed to ensure that the
values transmitted respect the declared object type of the channels on which they are communicated. The rule (t-out)
uses the obvious generalisation of the judgement (3) to values V , while in (t-rest) the standard notation , n :T is used
to denote the new environment obtained by extending the function  so that it now maps n to the type T. But inherent
in the use of this notation is that n is new to dom(). Similar notation is used in (t-nw). The only non-standard feature
in the typing rules of Table 2 is the condition T /= locc in (t-nw) and (t-rest). This additional condition precludes the
Table 2
Typing rules for typed DπLoc
Processes
(t-out)
  u :chV〈U˜〉
  V : U˜
  P
  u!〈V 〉.P
(t-in-rep)
  u :chV〈U˜〉
,X : U˜  P
  u?(X).P
  ∗u?(X).P
(t-nw)
T /= locc
, n :T  P
  (ν n :T)P
(t-cond)
  u :U, v :U
  P, Q
  if u=v then P else Q
(t-fork)
  P, Q
  P |Q
(t-axiom)
  0
(t-go)
  u : locV
  P
  go u.P
(t-ping)
  u : locV
  P, Q
  ping u.P else Q
Systems
(t-rest)
T /= locc
, n :T  N
  (ν n :T)N
(t-par)
  N, M
  N |M
(t-proc)
  l : locV
  P
  l[P ]
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creation of new confined locations and the existence of scoped confined locations, thereby guaranteeing the secondary
restriction of the type system discussed earlier, namely that all confined locations are free.
Example 3 (Type-checking systems). Let e denote the environment
e =
{
l :locap, k1 :locac, k2 :locac, k3 :locac,
req :chp〈P1, chp〈P1〉〉, ret :chp〈P1〉, v :P1, a :chp〈P2〉
where P1 and P2 are arbitrary public types. Then one can check
e  serveri
for i = 1 . . . 3, where serveri is defined in Section 1, provided the locally declared channels data and sync are declared
at the types chV〈T, chp〈T〉, locp〉 and chV〈T〉 respectively, with arbitrary visibility V.
Consider the alternative server
serverBad ⇐ server1 | l[[a!〈k1〉]]
which acts as server1 but also communicates the confined location k1 on channel a at l. It is easy to see that our type
system rejects serverBad, that is
e  serverBad
because it outputs a confined value, k1, on a public channel a. We know that the object type of the public channel a
must be public, P2, which cannot be matched with the confined type of the value outputted k1 when applying the typing
rule (t-out).
Consider another server
serverBad2 ⇐ (ν k1 : locac) server1
If we consider the slightly modified type environment
′e = e\k1 : locac
removing the type assignment to k1 from e, then our type system also rejects serverBad2, that is
′e  serverBad2
because the confined location k1 is scoped.
The main property required of our type system is that, in some sense, typing is preserved by substitution of values
for variables, provided their types are in agreement:
Lemma 4 (Substitution). If , x :U  P and   v :U, then   P {v/x}.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of , x :U  P . 
Reduction semantics:
Definition 5. The pair   M is called a configuration if all the free names in M have a type assigned to them in ,
that is fn(M) ⊆ dom(). It is called a valid configuration if in addition   M .
Reductions then take the form of a binary relation over configurations
  N −→′  N ′ (4)
defined in terms of the reduction rules in Table 3, whereby systems reduce with respect to the liveness status of the
locations in ; here we should emphasise that the reductions depend in no way on the type information in , other
than the liveness annotations on location types.
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Table 3
Reduction rules for DπLoc
Assuming   l :alive
(r-comm)
  l[a!〈V 〉.P ] | l[a?(X).Q] −→   l[P ] | l[Q{V/X}]
(r-rep)
  l[∗a?(X).P ] −→   l[a?(X).(P | ∗ a?(X).P )]
(r-fork)
  l[P |Q] −→   l[P ] | l[Q]
(r-eq)
  l[ if u=u then P else Q] −→   l[P ]
(r-neq)
  l[ if u=v then P else Q] −→   l[Q] u = v
(r-go)
  l[go k.P ] −→   k[P ]   k : alive
(r-ngo)
  l[go k.P ] −→   k[0]   k : alive
(r-ping)
  l[ping k.P else Q] −→   l[P ]   k : alive
(r-nping)
  l[ping k.P else Q] −→   l[Q]   k : alive
(r-new)
  l[(ν n :T)P ] −→   (ν n :T) l[P ]
(r-str)
  N ′ ≡   N   N −→ ′  M ′  M ≡ ′  M ′
  N ′ −→ ′  M ′
(r-ctxt-rest)
, n : T  N −→ ′, n : T  M
  (ν n : T)N −→ ′  (ν n : T)M
(r-ctxt-par)
  N −→ ′  N ′
  N |M −→ ′  N ′|M
  M|N −→ ′  M|N ′
Table 4
Structural rules for DπLoc
(s-comm) N |M ≡ M|N
(s-assoc) (N |M)|M ′ ≡ N |(M|M ′)
(s-unit) N |l[0] ≡ N
(s-extr) (ν n :T)(N |M) ≡ N |(ν n :T)M n ∈ fn(N)
(s-flip) (ν n :T)(ν m :R)N ≡ (ν m :R)(ν n :T)N
(s-inact) (ν n :T)N ≡ N n ∈ fn(N)
In these rules, in order to emphasise the meaning and abstract away from visibility type information, we write
  l :alive
instead of   l : locaV; we also write   l :alive instead of   l : locdV. Thus all reduction rules assume the location
where the code is executing is alive. Moreover, (r-go), (r-ngo), (r-ping) and (r-nping) reduce according to the status of
the remote location concerned. All the remaining rules are standard, including the use of a structural equivalence ≡
between systems; see [4] for more details. The attentive reader should have noted that when using the rules in Table 3,
whenever   N −→ ′  N ′ it can be deduced that ′ always coincides with . Even though this is certainly true, in
later sections we will introduce reductions that change network status of the reduct ′  N ′.
Proposition 6 (Subject reduction). If   M and   M −→   N , then   N .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of   M −→   N . As usual the main difficulty occurs with the communi-
cation rules, (r-comm) and (r-rep), where the Substitution lemma, Lemma 4 is used. Treatment of (r-str) also requires
us to prove that typeability is preserved by the structural equivalence. 
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Table 5
Error reductions in DπLoc
(e-out)
∃vi ∈ V such that   vi :locc or   vi :chc〈W˜〉
  l[a!〈V 〉.P ] −→err
(e-scope)
  (ν l :locSc)M −→err
(e-par)
  M −→err
  M |N −→err
  N |M −→err
(e-rest)
, n : T  M −→err
  (ν n :T)M −→err
We can also show that the type system does indeed fulfill its intended purpose. More specifically, in well-typed
systems
• confined values will never be made public,
• confined locations are never scoped.
In Table 5 we formalise these notions of runtime errors, writing
  N −→err
to mean that, intuitively, N is either about to export some confined value on a public channel, (e-out), or currently holds
a scoped confined location, (e-scope) - the remaining two rules in Table 5 are standard contextual rules. We show that
such errors can never occur in a valid environment.
Proposition 7 (Type safety). Suppose   N is a valid configuration, that is   N . If   N −→∗   N ′ then
  N ′ −→err.
Proof. From Subject Reduction, Proposition 6, we know that   N ′. It is also straightforward to show, using the
rules in Figure 5, that   M −→err implies  M , from which the result follows. 
In the remainder of the paper we will confine our attention to valid configurations; from the two previous propositions
we know that they are preserved under reductions and they do not give rise to runtime errors.
Behavioural equivalence: As the appropriate semantic equivalence for DπLoc, we propose a contextual equivalence
based on the standard notion of reduction barbed congruence [11,8], which is adapted to the presence of configurations.
More importantly, as explained in Section 1, we refine it further so as to ensure that observations can only be made at
public locations. This restriction is enforced using our type system.
For any  let pub() be the environment obtained by restricting to names which are assigned public types. Then
we write  obs O, meaning intuitively that O is a valid observer with respect to , whenever pub()  O.
Example 8 (Type system prevents errors). Referring back to Example 3, we have already seen that
e  serveri
for i = 1 . . . 3 but we can also check that the client, defined in Section 1, is also a valid observer with respect to
pub(e) which translates to
pub(e) = l :locap, req :chp〈P1, chp〈P1〉〉, ret :chp〈P1〉, v :P1, a :chp〈P2〉
We can thus show
e obs client
On the other hand consider
obseverBad ⇐ l[[go k1.go l.ok!〈〉]]
Intuitively this should not be considered a valid observer because it uses the confined value k1, and indeed we have
e obs observerBad
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By prohibiting their use of any confined values, valid observers are not only forced to be located to public locations,
but also constrained to migrate to public locations only.
Our typing system ensures that a valid observer can never obtain confined values under any sequence of interactions
within a well-formed configuration. Consider again the alternative server serverBad, already discussed in Example 3.
If we compose serverBad in parallel with the valid observer
observerGood ⇐ l[[a?(x).go x.go l.ok!〈〉]]
then one reduction step involving the communication of k1 on channel a yields
e  serverBad | observerGood −→ e  server1 | observerBad
Here the valid observer observerGood reduces to the invalid observer observerBad, which has obtained knowledge
of the confined location k1.
Our type system ensures that this never happens because, although we have
e obs observerGood
our type system rejects serverBad (Example 3).
It is convenient to define our behavioural equivalence so that it can relate arbitrary configurations, which now are
assumed to be valid; however, we would expect equivalent configurations to have the same public interface. We also
only expect it to be preserved by composition with valid observers. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 9 (o-Contextual). A relation overR configurations is called o-Contextual if, whenever   M R ′  N.
Interfaces: pub() = pub(′).
Parallel Observers:   M | O R 
′  N | O
  O | M R ′  O | N
}
whenever  obs O.
Fresh extensions: , n ::P  M R ′, n ::P  N .1
Since we want to limit observation to public resources, we restrict the standard notion of a barb and limit it to public
channels at public, live locations.
Definition 10 (o-Barb).   N ⇓oa@l denotes an o-observable barb by configuration   N , on channel a at location l.
This is true when   N −→∗   N ′ for some N ′ such that
N ′ ≡(ν n˜ : T˜)M|l[[a!〈V 〉.Q]]
where  l : locap, a : chp〈P˜〉. We say a relation over configurations preserves barbs if:
  M R ′  N
  M ⇓oa@l
}
implies   N ⇓oa@l
The next definition is standard (see [8]), but is added for completeness.
Definition 11 (Reduction closure). A relation overR configurations is reduction-closed whenever
M  M R N  N
M  M −→ ′M  M ′
}
implies N  N −→∗ ′N  N ′
for some configuration ′N  N ′ such that ′M  M ′ R ′N  N ′.
Combining these we obtain our touchstone equivalence for DπLoc:
Definition 12 (Reduction barbed congruence). Let ∼= be the largest relation between configurations which is:
• o-contextual,
• reduction-closed,
• preserves o-barbs.
1 Recall that this implies n is fresh to both  and ′.
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Example 13 (Equivalent configurations with restricted view). Our definition of reduction barbed congruence allows
us to limit observations to certain locations, thereby allowing a partial view of a system. For instance, even though the
equivalences defined in [4] could discriminate between server1, server2 and server3 running on a network without
failure, we can now say that these servers are observationally equivalent if observations are limited to location l. More
specifically, it turns out that
e  serveri ∼= e  serverj for i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
where e, previously defined in Example 3, is limiting observations to the only public location, l; the locations k1, k2
and k3 are confined in e.
3. Defining fault tolerance
We now give contextual definitions of fault-tolerance in the style of (1), outlined in Section 1. We use the touchstone
behavioural equivalence, Definition 12, to compare failure-free and failure-induced configurations. We also quantify
over all possible fault contexts, special contexts that induce faults. The specific form of these fault contexts embody
our assumptions about faults, which in turn determine the nature of our fault tolerance definitions.
Our definitions of fault tolerance are based on the clear separation of locations into two disjoint sets: reliable
locations and unreliable locations. Reliable locations are assumed to be immortal, whereas unreliable locations may
be dead already (permanently in fail-stop fashion [17]) or may die in future. An important assumption of our fault
tolerance definitions is that the separation between reliable and unreliable locations happens once, at the start of the
analysis, based on the location information at that moment; intuitively, we pick a subset from the free locations which
we assume to be unreliable. Since scoped locations are not known to us at this stage, we cannot tag them as unreliable,
which is why the type system in Section 2 precluded scoped unreliable(confined) locations. Once unreliable locations
are determined, we take a prescriptive approach and force observers to reside at reliable locations only, thereby ensuring
that they never incur failure directly. To put it more succinctly, observations never fail.
Nevertheless, an observer can still be affected by failure indirectly. This happens when an observer interacts with
system code residing at public locations whose behaviour depends, in some way or another, on code residing at
unreliable locations. In such a setting, fault tolerance would be a property of the system code at public locations,
which preserves its behaviour up to a certain level of fault, even when the unreliable code it depends on (residing at
unreliable locations) fails. If we map public locations to reliable locations and confined locations as unreliable, then
the framework developed in Section 2 fits our requirements for such a definition; the type system also ensures that
this clear separation between reliable and unreliable code is preserved during interaction, by ensuring that an observer
will never receive an unreliable location, when it is expecting a reliable one. In the remainder of the document we will
interchangeably use the terms reliable and unreliable for public and confined types respectively.
Our first notion of n-fault-tolerance, formalising the intuition behind (1), is when the faulting context induces at
most n location failures prior to the execution of the system. Of course, these failures must only be induced on locations
which are confined, based on the prior assumption that public locations are reliable, and thus immortal. The implicit
assumptions behind our first fault tolerance definition are that:
• either the unreliable locations have always been dead and no more failure will occur in future,
• or the frequency of failure occurrence, which often happens in bursts, is much lower than that of reduction steps,
within a give period of time. Thus we can assume that computations will not be interleaved by further failures.
Formally, we define the operation  − l as:
 − l def=
{
′, l : locdc if  = ′, l : locac
 otherwise
Definition 14 (Static fault tolerance). For any set of location names l˜ let F l˜S(−) be the function which maps any network
 to  − l˜; that is the environment obtained by ensuring that the status of any confined li in  is dead. We say F l˜S(−)
is a valid static n-fault context if the size of l˜ is at most n. A configuration   N is static n-fault tolerant if for every
valid static n-fault context F l˜S
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  N ∼= F l˜S()  N
With this formal definition we can now examine the systems serveri , using the e defined in Example 3.
Example 15 (Static fault tolerance). We can formally check that e  server1 is not static 1-fault tolerant because by
considering the fault context Fk1S we can show that
e  server1  Fk1S (e)  server1
Similarly we can show that e  server2 is not 2-fault tolerant, by considering its behaviour in the static 2-fault tolerant
context Fk1,k2S . More specifically here let client denote the system
l[[req!〈v, ret〉.ret?(x).ok!〈x〉]]
Then, assuming e has a suitable type for the channel ok, the configuration
e  server2 | client
can perform the barb ok@l, whereas with the configuration
e − {k1, k2}  server2 | client
this is not possible.
We can also examine other systems which employ passive replication. The system sPassive defined below uses
two identical replicas of the distributed database at k1 and k2, but treats the replica at k1 as the primary replica and the
one at k2 as a secondary (backup) replica. Once again, the type of the scoped channel data is T = chc〈P, chp〈P〉, locp〉,
where we recall that P denotes a public type.
sPassive ⇐ (ν data :T)
⎛⎜⎜⎝l
[
serv?(x, y).ping k1.go k1.data!〈x, y, l〉
else go k2.data!〈x, y, l〉
]
| k1[[data?(x, y, z).go z .y!〈f (x)〉]]
| k2[[data?(x, y, z).go z .y!〈f (x)〉]]
⎞⎟⎟⎠
The coordinating interface at l uses the ping construct to detect failures in the primary replica: if k1 is alive, the request
is sent to the primary replica and the secondary replica at k2 is not invoked; if, on the other hand, the primary replica is
dead, then the passive replica at k2 is promoted to a primary replica and the request is sent to it. This implementation
saves on time redundancy since, for any request, only one replica is invoked.
It turns out that e  sPassive is static 1-fault tolerant, as are e  server2 and e  server3. The latter, e 
server3, is also static 2-fault tolerant. However, establishing positive results is problematic because the definition of∼= quantifies over all valid observers and over all possible static n-fault contexts. The problems associated with the
quantification over all valid observers is addressed in the next section, when we give a co-inductive characterisation
of ∼=.
Our second notion of n-fault tolerance is based on faults that may occur asynchronously at any stage during the
execution of a system. This translates to a weaker assumption about the periodicity of faults than that underlying
Definition 14. Also, this second fault tolerance definition does not assume any dependency between faults. It only
assumes an upper-bound of faults and that faults are permanent.
To formalise this notion we to extend the language DπLoc, by introducing a new process called kill. Then the new
system l[[kill]] simply asynchronously kills location l. The reduction semantics, and typing rule, for this new construct
is given in Table 6. We use DπLoce to denote the extended language, and note that because of the typing rule only
confined locations can be killed. In particular this means that if O is an observer, that is  obs O, then O does not
have the power to kill any locations. The net effect is that reduction barbed congruence, M ∼= N , only compares the
systems M, N from DπLoce, in contexts which have no power to kill locations in M or N , although these systems
themselves may have this power.
Definition 16 (Dynamic fault tolerance). For any set of locations l˜ let F l˜D(−) denote the function which maps the
system M to M | l1[[kill]] | . . . | ln[[kill]] for any li ∈ l˜. Such a function is said to be a valid dynamic n-fault context if the
size of l˜ is at most n. A configuration N is dynamic n-fault tolerant if for every valid dynamic n-fault context
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Table 6
The kill construct
(t-kill)
  l : locc
  l[kill]
(r-kill)
  l[kill] −→ ( − l)  l[0]
  M ∼=   F l˜D(M)
Example 17 (Dynamic fault tolerance). As we shall see later on, it turns out that e  server2 and e  server3 are
both dynamic fault tolerant up to 1 fault; e  server3 is also dynamic 2-fault tolerant. We however note that, contrary
to the static case, e  sPassive is not dynamic 1-fault tolerant. This can be proved using Fk1D (−) and showing that
e  sPassive  e  sPassive | k1[[kill]]
The equivalence does not hold because k1 may fail after sPassive tests for its status. In this case, the backup database
at k2 is never queried and thus an answer will never reach l.
However, this is not the case for any passive replication server with two replicas. For instance, we can consider
sMonitor, defined as
sMonitor ⇐ (ν data :T)
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
l
⎡⎣⎡⎣serv?(x, y).(ν sync :R)
⎛⎝go k1.data!〈x, sync, l〉| mntr k1.go k2.data!〈x, sync, l〉
| sync?(z).y!〈z〉
⎞⎠⎤⎦⎤⎦
| k1[[data?(x, y, z).go z .y!〈f (x)〉]]
| k2[[data?(x, y, z).go z .y!〈f (x)〉]]
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where again, T = ch〈P, chp〈P〉, locp〉 and the type of the synchronisation channel sync is R = chc〈P〉. This passive
replication server still treats the database at k1 as the primary replica and the database at k2 as the secondary replica.
However, instead of a single ping test on the primary replica at k1, it uses a monitor process for failure detection
mntr k.P ⇐(ν test :ch〈〉)( test!〈〉 | ∗ test?().ping k. test!〈〉 else P )
The monitor process mntr k.P repeatedly tests the status of the monitored location (k) and continues as P only when k
becomes dead. Due to the asynchrony across locations, in sMonitor there are cases when we still receive two database
answers at l (the queried database at k1 may first return an answer and then fail). At this point the server interface
detects the failure and queries the backup at k2 which, in turn, returns a second answer. sMonitor solves this problem
by synchronising multiple answers from replicas with the channel sync, similar to server2 and server3 in Example 1.
It turns out that e  sMonitor is also dynamic 1-fault tolerant, but as in the case of e  server2 and e  server3,
such a positive result is hard to show because ∼= quantifies over all possible observers.
4. Proof techniques for fault tolerance
We define a labelled transition system (lts) for DπLoce, which consists of a collection of transitions over (closed)
configurations,   N μ−→ ′  N ′, where μ can be any of the following:
• internal action, τ ,
• output action, (n˜ : T˜)l : a!〈V 〉,
• input action, (n˜ : T˜)l : a?(V ),
where the names n˜ bind a subset of the names in V in both the input and output transitions. Bound names in output labels
denote scope extruded names whereas bound names in input labels denote fresh names introduced by the (implicit)
observer. These three transitions are defined inductively by the rules given in Tables 7 and 8, inspired by [9,8,4], but
with a number of differences.
In accordance with Definition 10 (observable barbs) and Definitions 9 (valid observers), (l-in) and (l-out) restrict
external communication to public channels at public locations, where the notation  obs l and  obs a denote   l :
locp and   a : chp〈P˜〉 respectively, for some types P˜. Furthermore, in (l-in) we require that the types of the values
received, V , match the object type of channel a; since a is public and configurations are well-typed, this also implies
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Table 7
Operational rules (1) for typed DπLoc
Assuming   l : alive
(l-in)
  l[a?(X).P ] l:a?(V )−→   l[P {V/X}]
 obs l,   a : chp〈P˜〉, V : P˜
(l-in-rep)
  l[∗a?(X).P ] τ−→   l[a?(X).(P | ∗ a?(X).P )]
(l-out)
  l[a!〈V 〉.P ] l:a!〈V 〉−→   l[P ]
 obs l, a
(l-fork)
  l[P |Q] τ−→   l[P ] | l[Q]
(l-eq)
  l[ if u=u then P else Q] τ−→   l[P ]
(l-neq)
  l[ if u=v then P else Q] τ−→   l[Q]
u = v
(l-new)
  l[(νn : T)P ] τ−→   (ν n : T) l[P ]
(l-kill)
  l[kill] τ−→ ( − l)  l[0]
(l-go)
  l[go k.P ] τ−→   k[P ]
  k : alive
(l-ngo)
  l[go k.P ] τ−→   k[0]
  k : alive
(l-ping)
  l[ping k.P else Q] τ−→   l[P ]
  k : alive
(l-nping)
  l[ping k.P else Q] τ−→   l[Q]
  k : alive
Table 8
Operational rules (2) for typed DπLoc
(l-open)
, n : T  N (n˜:T˜)l:a!〈V 〉−→ ′  N ′
  (ν n : T)N (n:T,n˜:T˜)l:a!〈V 〉−→ ′  N ′
l, a /= n ∈ V
(l-weak)
, n : T  N (n˜:T˜)l:a?(V )−→ ′  N ′
  N (n:T,n˜:T˜)l:a?(V )−→ ′  N ′
l, a /= n ∈ V
(l-rest)
, n : T  N μ−→ ′, n : T  N ′
  (ν n : T)N μ−→ ′  (ν n : T)N ′
n ∈ fn(μ)
(l-par-ctxt)
  N μ−→ ′  N ′
  N |M μ−→ ′  N ′ |M
  M |N μ−→ ′  M |N ′
(l-par-comm)
↑()  N (n˜:↑(T˜))l:a!〈V 〉−→ ′  N ′ ↑()  M (n˜:↑(T˜))l:a?(V )−→ ′′  M ′
  N |M τ−→   (ν n˜ : T˜)(N ′ |M ′)
  M |N τ−→   (ν n˜ : T˜)(M ′ |N ′)
that V are public values defined in . More prosaically, the object type of the input channel is P˜, and by Lemma 4,
we know the reduct is still well-typed. The restriction on the rule for output transitions, together with the assumption
that all configurations are well-typed, also means that in (l-open) we only scope extrude public values. Contrary to
[4], the lts does not allow external killing of locations (through the label kill : l) since public locations are reliable and
never fail. Finally, the transition rule for internal communication, (l-par-comm), uses an overloaded function ↑(−) for
inferring input/output capabilities of the sub-systems: when applied to types, ↑(T) transforms all the type tags to public
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Table 9
Fail silent transition rule DπLoc
(l-fail)
〈, n〉  N τ−→ 〈 − k, n − 1〉  N
  k :locac
(p); when applied to environments, ↑() changes all the types to public types in the same manner. The definitions for
these operations are
↑(T1, . . . , Tn) def= (↑(T1), . . . ,↑(Tn))
↑(, n : T) def= ↑(), n :↑(T)
↑(T) def=
{
chP〈↑(R˜)〉 if T = chV〈R˜〉
locSP if T = locSV
All the remaining rules are simplified versions of the corresponding rules in [4].
Using the lts of actions we can now define, in the standard manner, weak bisimulation equivalence over config-
urations. Our definition uses the standard notation for weak actions; we use ⇒ as a shorthand for the reflexive
transitive closure on silent transitions
τ
−→∗. Hence, μ⇒ denotes ⇒ μ−→⇒, and μ̂⇒ denotes
τ
−→∗ if μ = τ and
μ⇒ otherwise.
Definition 18 (Weak bisimulation equivalence). A relationR over configurations is called a bisimulation if whenever
M  M R N  N , then
• M  M μ−→ ′M  M ′ implies N  N
μˆ⇒ ′N  N ′ such that ′M  M ′ R ′N  N ′,
• N  N μ−→ ′N  N ′ implies M  M
μˆ⇒ ′M  M ′ such that ′M  M ′ R ′N  N ′.
Weak bisimulation equivalence, denoted by ≈, is taken to be the largest bisimulation.
Theorem 19 (Full abstraction). Suppose pub() = pub(′). Then for any DπLoce configurations   M, ′  N :
  M ∼= ′  N if and only if   M ≈ ′  N
Proof (Outline). To prove
  M ≈ ′  N implies   M ∼= ′  N
we show that ≈ satisfies all the defining properties of ∼= (Definition 12). The most involved task is showing that ≈
is o-Contextual (Definition 9). This has already been done in [4] for more complex contexts. Following the approach
there, we inductively define a relationR as the least relation over configurations satisfying:
R =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
〈1  M1, 2  M2〉 |1  M1≈2  M2, pub(1) = pub(2)
〈1  M1|O, 2  M2|O〉
〈1  O|M1, 2  O|M2〉
∣∣∣∣1  M1 R 2  M2 and 1 obs O
〈1, n :T  M1, 2, n :T  M2〉
∣∣∣∣1  M1 R 2  M2,n is fresh in 1, 2
〈1  (ν n :T)M1, 2  (ν n :U)M2〉 |1, n :T  M1 R 2, n :U  M2
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
InR we add an extra clause from those given in Definition 9, namely the last one for name scoping. We then show
thatR is a bisimulation; since ≈ is the largest possible bisimulation it follows thatR ⊆ ≈. Because of the definition
ofR it then follows that ≈, when confined to configurations with the same public interface, is o-Contextual.
The proof for the converse,
  M ∼= ′  N implies   M ≈ ′  N
relies on the notion of definability, that is, for every action, relative to a type environment , there is an observer which
uses the public knowledge of  to completely characterise the effect of that action. In our case, we only need to prove
definability for input/output actions, which has already been done for a more complex setting in [4]. For instance the
context which characterises the input transition labeled by (n˜ : T˜)l : a?(V ) would be
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[−] | O
where O is the system (ν n˜ : T˜)l[[a!〈V 〉.go k0.eureka!〈〉]] and k0 and eureka are fresh public location and channel
names, respectively. Because of the restrictions on the manner in which transitions can be inferred, we are assured that
O is allowed as an observer, that is  obs 0. 
Theorem 19 allows us to prove positive fault tolerance results by giving a bisimulation for every reduction barbed
congruent pair required by Definitions 14 and 16.
Example 20 (Proving static fault tolerance). To show that e  sPassive, defined earlier in Example 15, is static
1-fault tolerant we needed to show that sPassive preserves the same behaviour under any static 1-fault contexts. Now,
by the definition of the operation  − l, we know that the only l we need to consider are cases where l is confined in ;
otherwise  − l =  and the relation we have to prove would be a simple case of the identity relation. For our specific
case, since e has only 3 confined locations, we only need to consider three static 1-fault contexts, and by Theorem 19,
showing that e  sPassive is static 1-fault tolerant boils down to constructing 3 witness bisimulations to show
  sPassive ∼= ( − k1)  sPassive
  sPassive ∼= ( − k2)  sPassive
  sPassive ∼= ( − k3)  sPassive
Here we give the witness relation for the most involved case, for k1, and leave the other simpler cases for the interested
reader. The witness relation isR defined as
R def= {〈  sPassive,  − k1  sPassive〉} ∪
⎛⎝ ⋃
n,m∈Names
R′(n,m)
⎞⎠
R′(x, y) def=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
  (νd)l[[Png(x, y)]] | R1 | R2,  − k1  (νd)l[[Png(x, y)]] | R1 | R2
  (νd)l[[Q1(x, y)]] |R1 |R2,  − k1  (νd)l[[Q2(x, y)]] |R1 |R2
  (νd)k1[[d!〈x, y, l〉]] |R1 |R2,  − k1  (νd)k2[[d!〈x, y, l〉]] |R1 |R2
  (νd)k1[[go l .y!〈f (x)〉]] |R2,  − k1  (νd)R1 | k2[[go l .y!〈f (x)〉]]
  (νd)l[[y!〈f (x)〉]] |R2,  − k1  (νd)R1 | l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]
  (νd)R2,  − k1  (νd)R1
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
where d stands for data and
Png(x, y) ⇐ ping k1.Q1(x, y) else Q2(x, y)
Qi (x, y) ⇐ go ki .d!〈x, y, l〉
Ri ⇐ ki[[d?(x, y, z).go z .y!〈f (x)〉]]
R is the union of all the relationsR′(n,m) where n,m denote the possible names for the value and return channel that
are received on channel serv.
To facilitate our presentation, the general form of everyR′(n,m) is described throughR′(x, y), a relation between
configurations having two free variables, x and y; each R′(n,m) is obtained by instantiating x and y for n and m
respectively. In a similar fashion,R′(x, y) uses convenient abbreviations for processes, such as Png(x, y) - a shorthand
for a process with free variables x and y. InR′(n,m) this shorthand denotes the closed process Png(n,m).
Every R′(n,m) relates   sPassive and ( − k1)  sPassive and captures the essential mechanism of how
( − k1)  sPassive uses redundancy to preserve the same observable behaviour of   sPassive. In this mapping,
all the requests are serviced by the primary replica at k1 in   sPassive, whereas they are serviced by the secondary
replica at k2 in ( − k1)  sPassive.
5. Generic techniques for dynamic fault tolerance
In spite of the benefits gained from proof techniques developed in Section 4, proving positive fault tolerance
results still entails a lot of unnecessary repeated work. This problem is mainly due to Definition 14 and Definition 16,
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which quantify over all fault contexts. The universal quantification of fault contexts can generally be bounded, as in
Example 20, through the n index of the fault contexts (indicating the maximum failure to induce) and by the number of
unreliable locations defined in the environment, which limits the witness bisimulations we need to construct. Despite
such bounds on fault contexts, we are still required to perform much redundant work. For instance, to prove that server3
is 2-fault tolerant, we need to provide 6 bisimulation relations,2 one for every different case in
  server3 ∼=   server3|ki[[kill]]|kj [[kill]] for i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
A closer inspection of the required relations reveals that there is a lot of overlap between them. For instance, in the
witness bisimulation where i = 1, j = 2 and in the witness bisimulation for i = 1, j = 3, in each case part of our
analysis requires us to consider the behavior of server3 under a setting where k1 dies first, leading to a large number
of bisimilar tuples which are common to both witness bisimulations. These overlapping states would be automatically
circumvented if we require a single relation that is somewhat the merging of all of these separate relations.
Hence, in this section we reformulate our fault tolerance definition for dynamic fault tolerance (the most demanding)
to reflect such a merging of relations; a similar definition for the static case should be amenable to similar treatment.
We start by defining extended configurations, which have the form
〈, n〉  M
where M is a system from DπLoc and   M is a (valid) configuration. Intuitively, the extended configuration above
denotes a system M , without any sub-systems of the form l[[kill]], that is running on the network , where at most n
unreliable locations may fail. The additional network information in the form of a fault bound gives us an upper limit
on the unreliable locations that may still fail. It provides a more succinct way of expressing dynamic failure, without
recurring to the fault inducing code of the form l[[kill]]. More specifically, it allows us to express how many unreliable
locations may still fail, in line with Definition 16, without committing ourselves as to which of these locations will
fail, as is the case when using fault contexts. This leads to an alternative definition for dynamic fault tolerance that is
easier to work with.
The network fault upper bound gives us further advantages. For instance it gives us more control when, after
a possibly empty sequence of transitions, we reach configurations with n = 0; it less obvious to discern this from
systems containing asynchronous kills l[[kill]]. In these extreme cases, we can treat code at unreliable locations as
reliable, since the network failure upper-bound guarantees that none of these will fail, thereby simplifying our analysis.
We define transitions between tuples of extended configurations as
〈, n〉  M μ−→〈′, n′〉  M ′ (5)
in terms of all the transition rules given in Tables 7 and 8, with the exception of (l-kill), which is replaced by the
new transition (l-fail) defined in Table 9, describing dynamic failure. Even though the transitions in Tables 7 and 8
are defined on configurations, they can be applied to extended configurations in the obvious way. For example, the
previous transition (l-out) applied to extended configurations now reads
(l-out)
〈, n〉  l[[a!〈V 〉.P ]] l:a!〈V 〉−→ 〈, n〉  l[[P ]]
 obs l, a
We note that, for all transitions adapted from Tables 7 and 8, the network upper-bound does not change from the source
to the target configuration.
Our previous configurations   M can be viewed as a simple instance of extended configurations of the form
〈, 0〉  M where the maximum number dynamic failures that may occur at unreliable locations is 0. Also, using
transitions defined over extended configurations (5), we smoothly carry over the previous definition of bisimulation,
Definition 18, to extended configurations. We next give an alternative (co-inductive) definition of dynamic n-fault
tolerance, based on extended configurations.
2 The cases where the number n is less than 2 (in our case n = 1) is handled by the instance where both i and j are the same location; it is not
hard to show that   M|ki [kill]|ki [kill] ≈   M|ki [kill] for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} since a location cannot be killed twice.
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Definition 21 (Co-inductive dynamic fault tolerance). A configuration  N is co-inductive n (-dynamic) fault tolerant
if
〈, 0〉  M ≈ 〈, n〉  M
Before we can use Definition 21 to prove dynamic fault tolerance, we need to show that the new definition is sound
with respect to our previous definition of dynamic fault tolerance, Definition 16. This proof requires a lemma stating
the correspondence between actions in configurations and actions in extended configurations.
Lemma 22 (Actions for configurations and extended configurations). Suppose M is a DπLoc system. Then for every
n ≥ 0,
(1)   M μ−→   M ′ if and only if 〈, n〉  M μ−→ 〈, n〉  M ′,
(2)   M|l[[kill]] τ−→  − l  M|l[[0]] if and only if 〈, n + 1〉  M τ−→ 〈 − l, n〉  M .
Proof. The first statement is proved by induction the derivations of   M μ−→   M ′ and 〈, n〉  M μ−→ 〈, n〉 
M ′. The second is a simple analysis of the transitions involved. Note that here, because   M|l[[kill]] is assumed to be
a configuration, we are assured that   l : locac. See (t-kill) in Table 6. 
Theorem 23 (Soundness of co-inductive dynamic fault tolerance)
〈, 0〉  M1 ≈ 〈, n〉  M2 implies
{
for any dynamic n-fault context F l˜D
  M1 ∼=   F l˜D(M2).
Proof. LetRn be a relation parameterised by a number n and defined as
Rn def=
⎧⎨⎩1  M1, 2  M2 | li[[kill]]| . . . |lj [[kill]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
〈1, 0〉  M1 ≈ 〈2,m〉  M2
and 0 ≤ m ≤ n
⎫⎬⎭
We proceed by showing thatRn is a bisimulation over DπLocconfigurations, up to structural equivalence; that is
Rn ⊆ ≈ (6)
The required soundness result then follows because if
〈, 0〉  M ≈ 〈, n〉  M
then by (6) and the definition ofRn we know that for every dynamic n-fault context F l˜D(−), we also have
  M ≈   F l˜D(M)
Finally, by Theorem 19 we obtain
  M ∼=   F l˜D(M)
which by Definition 16 means that   M is dynamic n-fault tolerant.
In the proof of (6), we focus on matching the actions of the right hand side configuration inRn; we leave the simpler
case, that is matching the actions of the left hand side, to the interested reader. We thus assume
1  M1 Rn 2  M2 | li[[kill]]| . . . |lj [[kill]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
(7)
for some 0 ≤ m ≤ n and we have
2  M2 | li[[kill]]| . . . |lj [[kill]] μ−→ ′2  M ′2 (8)
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We have to show that
1  M1 μ̂⇒ 1  M ′1 such that 1  M′1 Rn ′2  M′2
From the structure of li[[kill]]| . . . |lj [[kill]], we deduce that there can be no interaction betweenM2 and li[[kill]]| . . . |lj [[kill]]
and, by (l-par), we conclude that this action can be caused by either of the following actions:
(a) 2  M2 μ−→ 2  M ′′2 where M ′2 ≡ M ′′2 | li[[kill]]| . . . |lj [[kill]]
(b) 2  li[[kill]]| . . . |lj [[kill]] μ−→ 2 − lk  li[[kill]]| . . . |lk[[0]]| . . . |lj [[kill]] where μ must be τ and M ′2 ≡
M2 | l′i[[kill]]| . . . |l′j [[kill]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1
(a) In this case, from (7) and the definition ofRn we know
〈1, 0〉  M1 ≈ 〈2,m〉  M2 (9)
Also, by (a) and Lemma 22(1) we also have
〈2,m〉  M2 μ−→ 〈2,m〉  M ′′2 (10)
From (9) we know that (10) can be matched by
〈1, 0〉  M1 μ̂⇒〈1, 0〉  M ′1 (11)
where 〈1, 0〉  M′1 ≈ 〈2,m〉  M ′′2 (12)
From (11) and Lemma 22(1) we deduce
1  M1 μ̂⇒ 1  M ′1
and from (12) and the definition ofRn we also know
1  M ′1 Rn 2  M ′′2 | li[[kill]]| . . . |lj [[kill]]
(b) In this case, once again from (7) and the definition ofRn we know
〈1, 0〉  M1 ≈ 〈2,m〉  M2 (13)
Using (8) and Lemma 22(2) we can derive
〈2,m〉  M2 τ−→ 〈2 − lk, m − 1〉  M2 (14)
From (13) we know (14) can be matched by
〈1, 0〉  M1 τ̂⇒〈1, 0〉  M ′1 (15)
where 〈1, 0〉  M′1 ≈ 〈2 − lk, m − 1〉  M2 (16)
From (15) and Lemma 22(1) we obtain
1  M1 τ̂⇒ 1  M ′1
and from (16) we get the required pairing
1  M ′1 Rn 2 − lk  M2| l′i[[kill]]| . . . |l′j [[kill]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1
. 
With Theorem 23, we can now give a single witness bisimulation to show the dynamic fault tolerance of a config-
uration. However, a considerable number of transitions in these witness bisimulations turn out to be confluent silent
transitions, meaning that they do not affect the set of transitions we can undertake in our bisimulations, now or in the
future. One consequence of this fact is that reduction via such confluent moves produces bisimilar configurations. We
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Table 10
β-Transition rules (1) for typed DπLoc
Assuming   l : alive
(b-in-rep)
〈, n〉  l[∗a?(X).P ] τ−→β 〈, n〉  l[a?(X).(P | ∗ a?(Y ).P {Y/X})]
(b-eq)
〈, n〉  l[ if u=u then P else Q] τ−→β 〈, n〉  l[P ]
(b-neq)
〈, n〉  l[ if u=v then P else Q] τ−→β 〈, n〉  l[Q]
u = v
(b-fork)
〈, n〉  l[P |Q] τ−→β 〈, n〉  l[P ] | l[Q]
(b-new)
〈, n〉  l[(ν n :T)P ] τ−→β 〈, n〉  (ν n :T)l[P ]
(b-par)
〈, n〉  N τ−→β 〈′, n′〉  N ′
〈, n〉  N |M τ−→β 〈′, n′〉  N ′|M
〈, n〉  M|N τ−→β 〈′, n′〉  M|N ′
(b-rest)
〈,m :T, n〉  N τ−→β 〈′,m :T, n′〉  N ′
〈, n〉  (ν m :T)N τ−→β 〈′, n′〉  (ν m :T)N ′
Table 11
β-Transition rules (2) for typed DπLoc
Assuming   l : alive
(b-ngo)
〈, n〉  l[go k.P ] τ−→β 〈, n〉  k[0]
  k : alive
(b-go-pub)
〈, n〉  l[go k.P ] τ−→β 〈, n〉  k[P ]
 obs l,   k : alive
(b-go-ff)
〈, 0〉  l[go k.P ] τ−→β 〈, 0〉  k[P ]
  k : alive
(b-nping)
〈, n〉  l[ping k.P else Q] τ−→β 〈, n〉  l[Q]
  k : alive
(b-ping-pub)
〈, n〉  l[ping k.P else Q] τ−→β 〈, n〉  l[P ]
 obs k
(b-ping-ff)
〈, 0〉  l[ping k.P else Q] τ−→β 〈, 0〉  l[P ]
  k : alive
thus develop up-to bisimulation techniques that abstract over such moves. This alleviates the burden of exhibiting our
witness bisimulations and allows us to focus on the transitions that really matter.
Based on [3], we denote β-actions or β-moves as
〈, n〉  N τ−→β 〈′, n〉  N ′
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Table 12
Structural equivalence rules for typed DπLoc configurations
(bs-comm) 〈, n〉  N |M ≡f 〈, n〉  M|N
(bs-assoc) 〈, n〉  (N |M)|M ′ ≡f 〈, n〉  N |(M|M ′)
(bs-unit) 〈, n〉  N |l[0] ≡f 〈, n〉  N
(bs-extr) 〈, n〉  (ν m :T)(N |M) ≡f 〈, n〉  N |(ν m :T)M m ∈ fn(N)
(bs-flip) 〈, n〉  (ν m1 :T)(ν m2 :U)N ≡f 〈, n〉  (ν m2 :U)(ν m1 :T)N
(bs-inact) 〈, n〉  (ν m :T)N ≡f 〈, n〉  N m ∈ fn(N)
(bs-dead) 〈, n〉  l[P ] ≡f 〈, n〉  l[Q]   l : alive
These β-transitions are defined in Tables 10 and 11. Our situation is more complicated than that in [3] because we also
have to deal with failure. While we directly inherit local rules, such as (b-eq) and (b-fork), and context rules, such as
(b-rest) and (b-par), we do not carry over distributed silent transitions such as code migration across locations. Instead,
we here identify three sub-cases when migration is a β-move, that is
• when we are migrating to a location that is dead, (b-ngo),
• when we are migrating from a public location (thus immortal) to another live location (b-go-pub),
• when both the source and destination locations are alive and we cannot induce further dynamic failures, (b-go-ff).
Migration across locations is generally not a confluent move because it can be interfered with by failure. More
specifically, the source location may fail before the code migrates, killing the code that could otherwise exhibit
observable behaviour at the destination location. However, migrations to a dead location k, (b-ngo), are confluent
because they all reduce to the system k[[0]] which has no further transitions. Migrations from an immortal location, (b-
go-pub), are confluent because failure can only affect the destination location; if the code migrates before the destination
location fails then it crashes at the destination; if it migrates after the destination fails then the case is similar to that of
(b-ngo).3 Finally, if we cannot induce more failures, as is the case of (b-go-ff), then trivially we cannot interfere with
migration between two live locations.
Similarly, pinging is generally not confluent because the location tested for may change its status and affect the
branching of the ping’s transition. However there are specific cases where it is a β-move, namely
• when the location tested is alive and no more failures can occur, (b-ping-ff),
• when the location tested is dead, (b-nping),
• when the location tested is public, and therefore immortal, (b-ping-pub).
In all three cases, the location tested for cannot change its status before or after the ping.
Even though a setting with failure requires us to analyse many more states than in a failure-free setting and limits the
use of β-moves, we can exploit the permanent nature of the failure assumed in our model to define a stronger structural
equivalence than the one defined earlier in Table 4. The new structural equivalence, denoted as ≡f, is strengthened by
defining it over extended configurations instead of over systems. It is the least relation satisfying the rules in Table 12
and closed under the obvious generalisation of the operations of parallel composition and name restriction to extended
configurations. Taking advantage of the network status, we can add a new structural rule, (bs-dead), which allows us
to equate dead code, that is code residing at (permanently) dead locations.
Example 24 (Stronger structural equivalence). Using ≡f, we can now equate the arbitrary systems l[[P ]] and k[[Q]]
running over the network 〈, n〉 when both l and k are dead in . The derivation is as follows:
〈, n〉  l[[P ]] ≡f 〈, n〉  l[[0]] (bs-dead)
≡f 〈, n〉  l[[0]] | k[[0]] (bs-unit)
≡f 〈, n〉  k[[0]] (bs-unit)
≡f 〈, n〉  k[[Q]] (bs-dead)
As with the standard structural equivalence, one can show that ≡f is a strong bisimulation:
3 The additional condition on the liveness of the destination location is extra but excludes cases when (b-ngo) can be applied instead.
42 A. Francalanza, M. Hennessy / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 73 (2007) 22–50
Lemma 25 (≡f is a strong bisimulation)
Proof. A long but straightforward induction on the proof of 〈, n〉  N ≡f 〈, n〉  M . 
Lemma 26 (Commutativity of ≡f and
τ−→β ). ≡f ◦
τ−→β implies τ−→β ◦ ≡f
Proof. If 〈, n〉  N ≡f ◦
τ−→β 〈, n〉  M then we know that there is some N ′ such that
〈, n〉  N ≡f 〈, n〉  N ′ (17)
〈, n〉  N ′ τ−→β 〈, n〉  M (18)
Now, mimicking the proof strategy of the previous lemma, we can use induction on the proof of (17) to find a matching
transition 〈, n〉  N τ−→β 〈, n〉  M ′ such that 〈, n〉  M ′ ≡f 〈, n〉  M. The existence of this M ′ ensures that
〈, n〉  N τ−→β ◦ ≡f 〈, n〉  M . 
Lemma 27 (Confluence of β-moves). τ−→β observes the following diamond property:
implies either μ is τ and 〈, n〉  M = 〈′, n′〉  N ′ or else
whereR is the relation
(
τ−→β ∪ ≡f ∪
τ−→β ◦ ≡f
)
.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of N and then by case analysis of the different types of μ
and induction on the derivation of the β-move.
As examples, we consider two of the more interesting cases. First we consider the case where the relationR required
to complete the confluence diamond is a case of ≡f. The second case is an instance whereR is
τ−→β ◦ ≡f.
(1) Consider the case where
N = l[[if n=n then Q1 else Q2]]for some n, Q1, Q2 (19)
μ = τ and n′ = n − 1 (a confined location was killed) (20)
By case analysis and (19), we know that the β-move is the local reduction (b-eq) and thus
M = l[[Q1]] (21)
From (20) we know the last rule used to derive the other action is (l-fail) and thus, using (19), we also derive
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N ′ = l[[if n=n then Q1 else Q2]]
′ = − k′ for some confined location k′ where   k′ : alive
We focus on the case where k′ = l and leave the case when k′ /= l to the interested reader. On one side, using
(21) we can produce
〈, n〉  l[[Q1]] τ−→ 〈 − l, n − 1〉  l[[Q1]]
But on the other side we cannot produce a matching β-move because l, the location the name matching β-move
is performed, is dead in  − l. However, the two reducts differ only with respect to dead code and we can use
R =≡f and (bs-dead) to get
〈 − l, n − 1〉  l[[if n=n then Q1 else Q2]] ≡f 〈 − l, n − 1〉  l[[Q1]]
(2) Consider a second case where
N = l[[go k.P ]] (22)
μ = τ and n′ = n − 1 (a confined location was dynamically killed) (23)
and moreover
l is public (immortal) in  (24)
k is confined (unreliable) but still alive in  (25)
Using (22), (24), (25) and case analysis we know that the β-move was derived using (b-go-pub), and thus we
obtain
M = k[[P ]] (26)
From (23) we know the last rule used to derive the other action is (l-fail) and thus, using (22), we also obtain
N ′ = l[[go k.P ]]
′ = − k′ for some confined location k′ where   k′ : alive
We focus on the case where k′ = k and leave the case when k′ /= k to the interested reader. On one side, using
(26) we can produce
〈, n〉  k[[P ]] τ−→ 〈 − k, n − 1〉  k[[P ]]
But on the other side we cannot produce a matching β-move using the same β-rule (b-go-pub) because k, the
destination of the migration, is dead in  − k. Instead, we can use an alternative β-move, this time using (b-ngo)
to obtain
〈 − k, n − 1〉  l[[go k.P ]] τ−→β 〈 − k, n − 1〉  k[[0]]
and use the case whenR = ( τ−→β ◦ ≡f) to relate the two reducts, which differ only with respect to dead code.
More precisely, we use (bs-dead) once again to get
〈 − k, n − 1〉  k[[P ]] ≡f 〈 − k, n − 1〉  k[[0]]. 
Example 28. Here we illustrate the fact that not all distributed migrations are confluent. Consider the configuration
〈, n〉  k[[go l.a!〈〉]]
where
• we can induce more dynamic failures, n ≥ 1,
• k, the source location of the migrating code, is alive but unreliable,   k :locac,
• l, the destination location is alive,   l : alive.
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Here, contrary to [3], the silent migration transition,
  k[[go l.a!〈〉]] τ−→   l[[a!〈〉]]
cannot be a β-move, even if we abstract over dead code. The problem occurs when we consider the transition killing
k, and obtaining
  k[[go l.a!〈〉]] τ−→ 〈 − k, n − 1〉  k[[go l.a!〈〉]]
Here we can never complete the diamond diagram for these two transitions, as required in Lemma 27.
Lemma 29 (Confluence over Weak moves)
where the length of the derivation of 〈, n〉  N μˆ⇒ 〈′, n′〉  N ′ is of the at most that of 〈, n〉  M μˆ⇒
〈′, n′〉  M ′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of derivation, using Lemma 27, Corollary 26 and Lemma 25. 
Proposition 30. Suppose 〈, n〉  N τ−→∗β 〈, n〉  M . Then 〈, n〉  N≈〈, n〉  M .
Proof. We defineR as
R =
{〈, n〉  N, 〈,m〉  M|〈, n〉  N τ−→β 〈,m〉  M
〈, n〉  N, 〈,m〉  M|〈, n〉  N ≡f 〈,m〉  M
}
Using Lemma 27 and Lemma 25 it is easy to show that R a bisimulation. Then by transitivity of ≈ we obtain the
required result. 
Definition 31 (Bisimulation up-to β-moves). A relationR over configurations is called a bisimulation up-to β-moves,
if whenever 〈N, n〉  N R 〈M,m〉  M then
• 〈N, n〉  N μ−→ 〈′N, n′〉  N ′ implies 〈M,m〉  M
μˆ⇒ 〈′M,m′〉  M ′ such that 〈′N, n′〉  N ′
τ−→∗β ◦ ≡f ◦R◦ ≈ 〈′M,m′〉  M ′
• 〈M,m〉  M μ−→ 〈′M,m′〉  M ′ implies 〈, n〉  N
μˆ⇒ 〈′N, n′〉  N ′ such that 〈′M,m′〉  M ′
τ−→∗β ◦ ≡f ◦R◦ ≈ 〈′N, n′〉  N ′
We use ≈β to denote the largest such relation.
Definition 31 provides us with a powerful method for approximating bisimulations. In a bisimulation up-to-β-moves
an action 〈N, n〉  N μ−→ 〈′N, n′〉  N ′ can be matched by a weak matching action 〈M,m〉  M
μˆ⇒ 〈′M,m′〉  M ′
such that up-to β-derivatives of 〈′N, n′〉  N ′ modulo structural equivalence on the one side, and upto bisimilarity on
the other side, the pairs 〈′N, n′〉  N ′ and 〈′M,m′〉  M ′ are once more related. Intuitively then, in such a relation a
configuration can represent all the configurations to which it can evolve using β-moves. in order to justify the use of
these approximate bisimulations we need the following result:
Lemma 32. Suppose 〈1, n1〉  M1 ≈β 〈2, n2〉  M2 and 〈1, n1〉  M1 μ̂⇒ 〈′1, n′1〉  M ′1. Then 〈2, n2〉  M2
μ̂⇒
〈′2, n′2〉  M ′2, where 〈′1, n′1〉  M ′1 ≈ ◦ ≈β ◦ ≈ 〈′2, n′2〉  M ′2.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of 〈1, n1〉  M1 μ̂⇒ 〈′1, n′1〉  M ′1. The base case, when the length
is zero and 1  M1 = ′1  M ′1 is trivial. There are two inductive cases. Here we focus on one case where
〈1, n1〉  M1 τ−→ 〈11, n11〉  M11 μ̂⇒ 〈′1, n′1〉  M ′1 (27)
and leave the other (similar) case for the interested reader.
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By the definition of ≈β , Definition 31, there exists 〈12, n12〉  M12 such that 〈2, n2〉  M2
τ
−→∗ 〈12, n12〉  M12 and
〈11, n11〉  M11 τ−→
∗
β≡ ◦ ≈β ◦ ≈ 〈12, n12〉  M12 (28)
By (27) and the expansion of (28) we have the following diagram to complete, for some 11, 22, M21 , M22 .
We immediately fill the first part of the diagram, using Lemma 29 and Lemma 25, to get the following:
By our inductive hypothesis we fill in the third part whereR =≈ ◦ ≈β ◦ ≈
And finally we complete the diagram by the definition of ≈
The required result follows from the above completed diagram and the fact that τ−→∗β ⊆ ≈, from Proposition 30,
and ≡f ⊆∼ ⊆ ≈, from Lemma 25. 
Proposition 33 (Soundness of bisimulations up-to-β-moves)
〈, n〉  N ≈β 〈′,m〉  M implies 〈, n〉  N ≈ 〈′,m〉  M
Proof. We prove the proposition by defining the relationR as
R = {〈, n〉  N, 〈′,m〉  M 〈, n〉  N ≈ ◦ ≈β ◦ ≈ 〈′,m〉  M}
and showing that it is a bisimulation. The result then follows, since ≈⊆ R.
Assume 〈1, n1〉  M1 μ−→ 〈′1, n′1〉  M ′1. By our definition of R, there exists 〈11, n11〉  M11 and 〈′2, n′2〉  M′2
such that
〈1, n〉  M1≈〈11, n11〉  M11 (29)
〈11, n11〉  M11 ≈β 〈′2, n′2〉  M ′2 (30)
〈′2, n′2〉  M ′2 ≈ 〈2, n2〉  M2 (31)
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From (29) and the definition of bisimulation we know
〈11, n11〉  M11 μ̂⇒ 〈21, n21〉  M21 such that 〈′1, n′1〉  M ′1 ≈ 〈21, n21〉  M21 (32)
By Lemma 32, (32), and (30) we know
〈′2, n′2〉  M ′2 μ̂⇒ 〈12, n12〉  M12 such that
〈21, n21〉  M21 ≈ ◦ ≈β ◦ ≈ 〈12, n12〉  M12 (33)
and by (33) and (31) we also conclude
〈2, n2〉  M2 μ̂⇒ 〈22, n22〉  M22 such that 〈12, n12〉  M12 ≈ 〈22, n22〉  M22 (34)
which is our matching move, where 〈′1, n′1〉  M ′1 R 〈22, n22〉  M22 by (32), (33), (34) and the transitivity of ≈. 
As a result of Theorem 23, in order to prove that server2 is dynamically 1-fault tolerant, we can use Definition 21
and give a single witness bisimulation relation satisfying
〈e, 0〉  server2 ≈ 〈e, 1〉  server2,
as opposed to three separate relations otherwise required by Definition 16. But now, because of Proposition 33 we can
go one step further and limit ourselves to a single witness bisimulation up-to β-moves. This approach is taken in the
following, final, example.
Example 34 (Proving dynamic fault tolerance). Consider the relationR over extended configurations, defined by
R def= {〈  server2,   server2〉} ∪
⎛⎝ ⋃
m,m′∈Names
R′(m,m′)
⎞⎠
R is the union of all the relations R′(m,m′) where we substitute the variables x, y in R′(x, y) by names m,m′ ∈
Names. For clarity, the presentation ofR′(x, y):
• omits type information associated with scoped names data and sync
• uses the shorthand n˜ for data, sync and  for e defined earlier;  is also used as an abbreviation for 〈, n〉 whenever
n = 0
• uses the following process definitions from Example 20:
S(y)⇐sync?(x).y!〈x〉
Ri ⇐ki[[data?(x, y, z).go z .y!〈f (x)〉]]
The mapping of the intermediary states in R′(x, y) is based on the separation of the sub-systems making up server2
(and its derivatives) into two classes, based on their dependencies on the unreliable locations k1, k2 and k3:
Independent:sub-systems whose behaviour is not affected by the state of ki for i = 1..3. An example of such code is
the located process l[[sync?(x).y!〈x〉]], denoted as l[[S(y)]] above.
Dependent:sub-systems whose behaviour depends on the state of ki for i = 1..3. Examples of such sub-systems are
• located processes that intend to go to ki , such as the queries sent to the database replica go ki .d!〈x, y, l〉.
• processes that reside at ki , such as the database replicas themselves, denoted as Ri above and its derivative
ki[[go l .y!〈f (x)〉]].
• located processes that have migrated from ki , such as replies from these replicas, l[[y!〈f (x)〉]].
In server2 there are sub-systems dependent on k1 and k2 but not on k3. To relate sub-systems dependent on unreliable
locations,R′(x, y) uses three asymmetric relations ranging over systems:
• RIdi (x, y) is a (quasi) identity relation; when we define the actual relation we explain why it is not exactly the
identity.
• R0i (x, y) maps left systems depending on ki to the null process at ki on the right, ki[[0]]. We use this mapping when
ki is dead, exploiting the structural equivalence rule (bs-dead).
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• R≥i (x, y), maps left systems depending on ki to the null process at l on the right, l[[0]]. We use this mapping when
in order to reach a bisimilar state, the replica at ki must have been successfully queried and the answer must have
been successfully returned and consumed by l[[S(y)]].
InR′(x, y), the dependent sub-systems are related with these three sub-relations depending on two factors: (1) the
state of the respective ki they depend on (2) whether the global system is in a position to output an answer back to the
observer. More specifically:
(1) As long as ki is alive in the right configuration, then the sub-systems depending on ki is related to its corresponding
sub-system in the left hand configuration usingRIdi (x, y) for i = 1..2.
(2) When ki for i = 1..2 dies, then we refer to the second criteria, that is whether the global system is ready or not
to return an answer back to the observer, derived from the fact that l[[S(y)]] has not yet reduced:
(a) If the global system is not ready to output an answer back to the observer, then we relate the sub-systems
depending on ki using R01(x, y). We note that here we make use of β-moves such as those using (b-ngo)
and structural rules such as (bs-dead) from Table 11 and Table 12 respectively. To map dead code and code
migrating to dead locations to ki[[0]]. The other sub-system depending on the other unreliable location (kj
for j /= i) is still related usingRIdi (x, y).
(b) If the global system is ready to output an answer back to the observer (l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]), or has already done so,
then we relate the sub-systems depending on the dead location ki using R01(x, y). The difference from the
previous case lies in the mapping used for the sub-systems depending on kj , the other unreliable location.
Here we have two further sub-cases:
(i) If ki died before servicing the query, that is before returning an answer sync!〈f (x)〉 back to l, then the
only way we can output an answer back to the observer is through the complete servicing of the other
replica at kj . Thus we map the sub-system depending on kj in the left configuration to the corresponding
sub-system on the right usingR≥2 (x, y).
(ii) If ki died after servicing the query, we simply match the sub-systems depending on the other unreliable
location kj using the identity relationRIdi (x, y) as before.
For clarity, the presentation ofR′(x, y) is partitioned into three groups of clauses, each containing 4 clauses each.
• The first group describes the cases where the configurations are not ready to output back an answer to the observer
(case 2(a)).
• The second group describes the cases where the configurations are ready to output back an answer to the observer
(case 2(b)).
• The third group describes the cases where the configurations have already outputted back an answer to the observer.
We note that, in contrast to Example 20, the three sub-relations below abstract away from mapping the sub-system
reduct
Qi (x, y) ⇐ l[[go ki .data!〈x, y, l〉]]
Since we are only required to give a bisimulation up-to β, the β-rule (b-go-pub) allows us to automatically abstract
away from such an intermediary process in R′(x, y), since the migration source location l is public, thus immortal.
Similarly, the two sub-relationsR0i (x, y) andR≥i (x, y) abstract away from mapping tuples like
〈ki[[go l .y!〈f (x)〉]], ki[[0]]〉 and 〈ki[[go l .y!〈f(x)〉]], l[[0]]〉
respectively. Since the left hand configuration executes in a (dynamic) failure-free setting, we can apply the β-rule
(b-go-ff) to abstract away over the intermediary process ki[[go l .y!〈f (x)〉]]. For the same reason, RIdi (x, y) is not
exactly the identity relation; the β-rule (b-go-ff) allows us to abstract away from ki[[go l .y!〈f (x)〉]] and instead we
have the pair
〈l[[y!〈f (x)〉]], ki[[go l .y!〈f (x)〉]]〉
We note however that for cases when the potential dynamic failure is also 0 in the right configuration (this
happens after we induce one failure), then we can perform the same abstraction on the right hand side, omit the
above pair and obtain an identity relation. More specifically, in R′(x, y), this happens for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th and
12th clauses.
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R′(x, y) def=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
  (νn˜)
(
l[[S(y)]]
|M1 |M2
)
, 〈, 1〉  (νn˜)
(
l[[S(y)]]
|N1 |N2
) 〈M1, N1〉 ∈ RId1 (x, s)
〈M2, N2〉 ∈ RId2 (x, s)
  (νn˜)
(
l[[S(y)]]
|M1 |M2
)
, −k1  (νn˜)
(
l[[S(y)]]
|N1 |N2
) 〈M1, N1〉 ∈ R≥1 (x, s)
〈M2, N2〉 ∈ RId2 (x, s)
  (νn˜)
(
l[[S(y)]]
|M1 |M2
)
, −k2  (νn˜)
(
l[[S(y)]]
|N1 |N2
) 〈M1, N1〉 ∈ RId1 (x, s)〈M2, N2〉 ∈ R≥2 (x, s)
  (νn˜)
(
l[[S(y)]]
|M1 |M2
)
, −k3  (νn˜)
(
l[[S(y)]]
|N1 |N2
) 〈M1, N1〉 ∈ RId1 (x, s)
〈M2, N2〉 ∈ RId2 (x, s)
  (νn˜)
(
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]
|M1 |M2
)
, 〈, 1〉  (νn˜)
(
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]
|N1 |N2
) 〈M1, N1〉 ∈ RId1 (x, s)
〈M2, N2〉 ∈ RId2 (x, s)
  (νn˜)
(
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]
|M1 |M2
)
, −k1  (νn˜)
(
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]
|N1 |N2
) 〈M1, N1〉 ∈ R01(x, s)〈M2, N2〉 ∈ R≥2 (x, s)
  (νn˜)
(
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]
|M1 |M2
)
, −k2  (νn˜)
(
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]
|N1 |N2
) 〈M1, N1〉 ∈ R≥1 (x, s)
〈M2, N2〉 ∈ R02(x, s)
  (νn˜)
(
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]
|M1 |M2
)
, −k3  (νn˜)
(
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]
|N1 |N2
) 〈M1, N1〉 ∈ RId1 (x, s)
〈M2, N2〉 ∈ RId2 (x, s)
  (νn˜) (M1 |M2) , 〈, 1〉  (νn˜) (N1 |N2) 〈M1, N1〉 ∈ RId1 (x, s)〈M2, N2〉 ∈ RId2 (x, s)
  (νn˜) (M1 |M2) , −k1  (νn˜) (N1 |N2) 〈M1, N1〉 ∈ R01(x, s)〈M2, N2〉 ∈ R≥2 (x, s)
  (νn˜) (M1 |M2) , −k2  (νn˜) (N1 |N2) 〈M1, N1〉 ∈ R≥1 (x, s)〈M2, N2〉 ∈ R02(x, s)
  (νn˜) (M1 |M2) , −k3  (νn˜) (N1 |N2) 〈M1, N1〉 ∈ RId1 (x, s)〈M2, N2〉 ∈ RId2 (x, s)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
R0i (x, y)
def=
⎧⎨⎩
ki[[d!〈x, y, l〉]] |Ri , ki[[0]]
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]], ki[[0]]
l[[0]], ki[[0]]
⎫⎬⎭ R≥i (x, y)def=
⎧⎨⎩
ki[[d!〈x, y, l〉]] |Ri , l[[0]]
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]], l[[0]]
l[[0]], l[[0]]
⎫⎬⎭
RIdi (x, y)
def=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
ki[[d!〈x, y, l〉]] |Ri , ki[[d!〈x, y, l〉]] |Ri
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]], ki[[go l .y!〈f (x)〉]]
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]], l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]
l[[0]], l[[0]]
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
To elucidate the above presentation, we consider a number of possible transitions inR′(x, y) as an example. Assume
we are one of the states described by the first clause inR′(x, y)
  (νn˜)
(
l[[S(y)]]
|M1 |M2
)
, 〈, 1〉  (νn˜)
(
l[[S(y)]]
|N1 |N2
) where
〈M1, N1〉 ∈ RId1 (x, s)
〈M2, N2〉 ∈ RId2 (x, s)
(35)
If in either configuration (left or right), we accept an answer from any replica and l[[S(y)]] goes to l[[y!〈f (x)〉]], then
we can match this with an identical transition and go to a state described by the 4th clause
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  (νn˜)
(
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]
|M ′1 |M ′2
)
, 〈, 1〉  (νn˜)
(
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]
|N ′1 |N ′2
) where
〈M ′1, N ′1〉 ∈ RId1 (x, s)
〈M ′2, N ′2〉 ∈ RId2 (x, s)
If on the other hand, from (35) the right configuration performs a τ -move and injects a dynamic fault at k1 (the case
for k2 is dual), we transition to a state described by the 2nd clause
  (νn˜)
(
l[[S(y)]]
|M1 |M2
)
,  − k1  (νn˜)
(
l[[S(y)]]
|N1 |N2
) where
〈M1, N1〉 ∈ R01(x, s)
〈M2, N2〉 ∈ RId2 (x, s)
(36)
At this point, any actions by M2 or N2 are mapped by the identical action on the opposite side, while still remaining
in a state described by the 2nd clause of the relation. If however in 36, M1 is involved in an action, then we have two
cases:
• If the action involving M1 causes l[[S(y)]] to reduce to l[[y!〈f (x)〉]] while reducing to M ′1 itself, then we transition
to a state described by the 5th clause
  (νn˜)
(
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]
|M ′1 |M2
)
, −k1  (νn˜)
(
l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]
|N1 |N ′2
) where
〈M ′1, N1〉 ∈ R01(x, s)〈M2, N ′2〉 ∈ R≥2 (x, s)
where on the right hand side, N2 has compensate for the inactive N1 and match the move by weakly reducing to N ′2,
interacting with its respective l[[S(y)]] so that it reduces it to l[[y!〈f (x)〉]]. We highlight the fact that this internal
interaction cannot be done by N1 since k1 is dead.
• Otherwise, if l[[S(y)]] is not affected, we match the silent move from M1 with the empty move on the right hand
side.
6. Conclusions and related work
This paper is a revised and extended version of the conference presentation [5]. We adopted a subset of [4] and
developed a theory for system fault tolerance in the presence of fail-stop node failure. We formalised two definitions
for fault tolerance based on the well studied concept of observational equivalence. The first definition assumes a static
network state whereby the faults have already been induced; the second definition assumes that faults may be induced
dynamically at any stage of the computation. Subsequently, we developed sound proof techniques with respect to these
definitions which enable us to give tractable proofs to show the fault tolerance of systems; we gave two example proofs
using these proof techniques.
Future work
The immediate next step is to apply the theory to a wider spectrum of examples, namely systems using replicas with
state and system employing fault tolerance techniques such as lazy replication: we postulate that the existing theory
should suffice. Other forms of fault contexts that embody different assumptions about failures, such as fault contexts
with dependencies between faults, could be explored. Another avenue worth considering is extending the theory to
deal with link failure and the interplay between node and link failure [4]. In the long run, we plan to develop of a
compositional theory of fault tolerance, enabling the construction of fault tolerant systems from smaller component
sub-systems. For all these cases, this work should provide a good starting point.
Related work
To the best of our knowledge, Prasad’s thesis [14] is the closest work to ours, addressing fault tolerance for
process calculi. Even though similar concepts such as redundancy (called “duplication”) and failure-free execution
are identified, the setting and development of Prasad differs considerably form ours. In essence, three new operators
(“displace”, “audit” and “checkpoint”) are introduced in a variant of CCS; equational laws for terms using these
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operators are then developed so that algebraic manipulation can be used to show that terms in this calculus are, in some
sense, fault tolerant with respect to their specification.
The use of confluence of certain τ -steps as a useful technique for the management of large bisimulations is not new.
It has been already studied extensively in [13,7]. See [6] for particularly good examples of where they have significantly
decreased the size of witness bisimulations. Elsewhere, Nestmann et al. [12] have explored various other ways of using
bounds in the environment to govern permissible failures.
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